Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)

1951

Utah Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Commission
of Utah et al : Brief of Respondent Utah Natural
Gas Company
Utah Supreme Court

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machinegenerated OCR, may contain errors.
Clifford L. Ashton; S. N. Cornwall; Attorneys for Respondent;
Recommended Citation
Brief of Respondent, Utah Pipe Line Co. v. Public Service Comm. Of Utah, No. 7695 (Utah Supreme Court, 1951).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/1524

This Brief of Respondent is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.

In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
UTAH PIPE LINE COMPANY, a Corporation,

Petitioner,
~

vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION O·F
UTAH, HAL S. BENNETT, W. R.
McENTIRE and STEWART M.
HANSON, Commissioners of the· Public Service Commission of Utah, and
UTAH NATURAL GAS COMPANb
a Corporation,
, tH'

Respond~ts.

Case No.
7695

I-.i~ .A E
·. ~·1 D
~·· . -.
§\

·~

OC_\. 2 G VJS'\
~--- ~o.

---ct;;:t::s~~;;;;;~c;;~~~-u-~.ili

BRIEF OF_RESPONDENT UTAH
NATURAL GAS COMPANY
CLIFFORD L. ASHTON,
S. N. CORNWALL,

Attorneys for Respondent,
Utah Natural Gas Company.
ARROW PRESS, SALT LAKE

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX

Page
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

1

~..........

4

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON . . . . . . . .

17

ARGUMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

19

POINT I. THE CONDITIONAL ORDER MADE
WAS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION AND
POWER OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF THE STAT·E OF UTAH . . . . . . . . .

19

POINT II. THE CONDITIONAL ORDER MADE
IS REASONABLE AND IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST .................. ·.................

31

POINT III. THE APPELLANT IS NOT A PARTY
AGGRIEVED BY THE ORDER HEREIN APPEALED FROM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

33

POINT IV. THE CONDITIONAL ORDER MADE
BY THE COMMISSION DOES NOT VIOLATE
THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL OR STATE CONSTITUTION AND
DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNLAWFUL
DELEGATION OF POWER TO AN UNNAMED GEOLOGIST· AND DOES NOT PERMIT A FINDING ON A MATERIAL F'ACT
BASED SOLELY ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE . .

41

POINT V. THE C·OMMISSION'S FINDING THAT
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATURAL
RESOURCES OF THE STATE IS DESIRABLE IS A PROPER FINDING AND IS NOT
ONE WHICH INDICATES A FAILURE TO
REGULARLY PURSUE ITS STATUT·ORY
AUTHORITY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

45

STATEMENT OF FACTS .............

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-Continued
Page
POINT VI. THE COMMISSION DID NOT EXCEED ITS L·AWFUL AUTHORITY IN HEARING THE APPLICATION OF THE UTAH
NATURAL GAS COMPANY BEFORE IT
HEARD THE APPLICATION OF APPEL~
LANT .....................................

49

POINT VII. THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF UTAH DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY AND CAPRICIOUSLY IN NOT HAVING
A FULL JOINT HEARING BEF'ORE THE
FEDERAL POWER COMMISSION BEFORE
RULING ON RESPONDENT'S APPLICATION.

52

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55

CASES CITED

Re Achtenburg, 8 P. U. R. New Series 397 (Mo.) .... 25, 27
Alabama Power Co. v. Ickes, et al., 58 S. Ct. 300 . . . . . 39
Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Federal Power Commission, et al., 113 F. (2d) 281 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
Backus-Brooks Company v. Northern Pacific Railroad Company, et al., 21 F. (2d) 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
In Re Clays, 1924-E P. U. R. 178 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
Federal Power Commission, et al., v. Hope Natural
Gas Co., 64 S. Ct. 281 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Re Grand Rapids Gas Light Co., 13 P. U. R. New
Series 445 (Mich.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25, 27
Incorporators of Service Gas Company v. Public Service Commission of Pennsylvania, 126 Pa. Super.
Ct. 381, 190 A. 653 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co., et al. v. Public Utilities
Commission, 63 Utah 392, 226 P. 456 . . . . . . . . . . 22

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

INDEX-Continued
Page
Re Kansas Pipe Line & Gas Co. andRe North Dakota
Consumers Gas Co., 30 P. U. R. (N. S.) 321 . . . . .

30

Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Company v. Public
Utilities Commission of Utah, et al., 80 Utah 455,
15 P. (2d) 358 and 81 Utah 286, 17 P. (2d) 287 . .

23

L. Singer & Sons, et al. v. Union Pacific Railroad
Company, 61 S. Ct. 254 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

Moffat Tunnel League, et al. v. United States, 53 S.
Ct. 543 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

Re Montana Dakota Power Company, P. U. R. 1929-A
369 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

47

Northwest Businessmen's Association v. Illinois Commission, 168 N. E. 890 ................ ·. . . . . . . .

46

Rochester Telephone Corporation v. United States,
59 S. Ct. 754 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

37

State Ex Rei. Thatcher v. Boyle, et al., 204 P. 378 . . . .

46

Re Tennessee Gas & Transportation Co., 40 P. U. R.
New Series 129 (Tenn.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

25

Re Wilcox, P. U. R. 1916 C (Idaho) ............ 21, 25, 26
STATUTES CITED

Utah Code Annotated
Section 76-4-1 .............................. 19, 20
Section 76-4-24 ............................. 19, 20
Section 76-6-16 ............................. 21, 34
United States Code Annotated
Chap. 15 (b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sec. 717g. (c) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Sec. 717p. . ................................ ·. .

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

34
30
53

In the

Supreme Court of the State of Utah
UTAH PIPE LINE COMPANY, a Corporation,
Petitioner,
vs.
PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH, HAL S. BENNETT, W. R.
McENTIRE and STEWART M.
HANSON, Commissioners of the Public Service Commission of Utah, and
UTAH NATURAL GAS COMPANY,
a Corporation,
Respondents. j

Case No.
7695

;

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT UTAH
NATURAL GAS COMPANY
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
On the 29th day of May, 1950, Respondent Utah Natural Gas Company, a Delaware corporation, qualified to
do business in Utah, made application to the Public Ser-
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vice Commission of Utah for a certificate of convenience
and necessity authorizing it to transport and supply natural
gas from. gas fields in Southeastern Utah, primarily at
Boundary Butte and Monticello, to the industrial area in
and around Salt Lake City (R. 1106-1110). On November
17, 1950, this Respondent amended its original application
and requested a certificate to build its line along the route
proposed in its original application and also to construct
a supplmentary line from Last Chance to Salina, connecting with the main line at Fountain Green. It was proposed
that this supplementary line would serve an area in the
Sevier Valley and that the interconnected line would serve
the industrial area from Provo north to Salt Lake City
(R. 1111-1117).
The hearing on the amended application was set for
the 11th of December, 1950. Five days prior to that date
the Utah Pipe Line Company, Appellant herein, was organized as a Delaware corporation. On December 9th it
was authorized to do business in the State of Utah and,
two days later, on the date of the hearing, appeared before
the Public Service Commission of Utah and requested leave
to intervene and introduce evidence on behalf of its application. This request was refused but the Commission did
permit Appellant to intervene for the limited purpose of
objecting to the application of the Utah Natural Gas Company (R. 10-13). Parenthetically, it is interesting to speculate on what Appellant would have done had it been permitted to intervene as a competing applicant. As a two
day old corporation without an acre of committed or even
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prospective gas in the State of Utah and without any authority or certificate from the Federal Power Commission
to bring claimed New Mexico gas across two state lines
how could Appellant have made even a semblence of a showing?
Both Appellant and the Utah Natural Gas Company,
at the time of the hearing before the Utah Public Service
Commission, were skeleton corporations. Both were sponsored by other interests to perform the express. function
of transporting and marketing natural gas. The Respondent company was sponsored by Byrd-Frost, Inc., of Dallas,
Paul B. English, The Three States Natural Gas Company,
and others. The Appellant company was sponsored solely
by the Delhi Oil Corporation. All these sponsors are petroleum producers not engaged in the transporting and marketing of petroleum products.
After conducting prolonged hearings in 1950, which
hearings were continued to January and conducted through
a part of February in 1951, the Commission took the matter under advisement and on the 12th day of March, 1951,
signed an order granting to this Respondent a certificate
conditioned that, within one year of the effective date of
said order, it should:
"{a) File with this Commission the unconditional commitment of a financial house of recognized responsibility, committing itself to supply the
funds necessary to the construction of the pipe line
and facilities to be installed by Utah Natural Gas
Company;
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" (b) Concurrently with the furnishing of such
commitment and as a part thereof, Utah Natural
Gas Company shall file with this Commission the
certificate of an independent geologist of recognized
professional standing acceptable to this Commission
that there are proven gas reserves committed to
Utah Natural Gas Company adequate to justify the
construction of the line and facilities.
"(c) Deposit with this Commission copies of
any gas purchase contracts entered into with owners
of producing gas wells.
"(d) Deposit with this Commission a copy or
copies of its contracts. then entered into with a recognized responsible construction firm or firms for
the construction of said line and facilities; and
" (e) Pending the compliance with the conditions herein imposed, Utah Natural Gas Company
shall make no public offering of its stock or other
securities" (R. 1173).
From this conditional order the Appellant company
petitioned for a rehearing. On the 16th day of April, 1951,
this petition was denied (R. 1182). On May 11, 1951,
Appellant filed in this Court its petition for a writ of certiorari (R. 1184-1192). Appellant is the only one of all the
protestants who has appealed from the Commission's order.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
We feel that the Appellant in presenting its statement
of facts to this Court at pages 3-22 of its brief has ignored
many important phases of the presentation made before
the Commission. Therefore, we propose to outline briefly
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a more comprehensive statement of facts so that this Court
may have a better understanding of this Respondent's
position and its reasons for seeking the conditional certificate granted.
Respondent company's evidence falls into four categories. First, public need; second, availability of natural gas
in the vicinity of the proposed pipe line; third, feasibility
of the engineering plan; and fourth, feasibility of the
financial plan.

Public Need-There is very little point in setting
out testimony of the public witnesses who appeared and
testified to the great need in the Salt Lake industrial area
of natural gas. The record shows that the southeastern
and central portions of the state are without any present
supply. The record also amply shows that industrial development, domestic convenience and the building of new
homes is greatly retarded because of either no natural gas
or an insufficient supply. This fact is conceded by App~l
lant and is its reason for seeking a certificate of its own.
1.

Availability of Natural Gas in the Vicinity of the
Proposed Line-This evidence consists of testimony of seven
trained geologists who are presently actively engaged in
exploratory and development work in the central and southeastern portion of the state. They are Kenneth M. Willson,
Dorsey Hager, Glen Ruby, Paul Walton, R. E. Landon, D.
H. Byrd and Jack Frost.
2.

Mr. Willson, who is an independent consulting geologist and who has been.employed for the past several years
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by Byrd-Frost, Inc., working in the Four Corners area, testified from a carefully prepared report of the known gas
reserves, the probable gas reserves and the general gas
potential of the entire southeastern and central area of
the state. His report was especially significant because
of the great amount of work done by him in the general
area, during the past few years. His recommendations
have resulted in the drilling of thirty-five producing oil
and gas wells and only eight dry holes ( R. 55) .
After generally discussing the area in the vicinity of
the pipe line and explaining to the Commission his reasons
for believing that there is an ample supply of gas to justify
the construction of the proposed line the witness specifically discussed three structures which he believed would
produce a sufficient quantity of commercial gas to supply
the line over a twenty year period. These structures are
Boundary Butte, Monticello, and Last Chance. In explaining the reserves in the foregoing structures the witness
repeatedly emphasized that he had kept his estimates conservative so that any error would be on the safe side. He
also pointed out that Mr. Joseph Gordon, a petroleum geologist, collaborated with him in computing the reserve on
the data which he supplied (Exhibit 28-34, R. 1067-1073).
Boundary Butte, he explained, was a known producer
of nat~ral gas. It had not been developed because there
is not a line to take the gas to market. This structure, he
estimated, contains 348 billion cubic feet of recoverable
natural gas (R. 70). Because, however, the Boundary Butte
gas does not have the required b. t. u. content it will be
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necessary to process it and remove inert materials. As a
result the witness estimated that the Boundary Butte structure can produce approximately 255 billion cubic feet of
648 b. t. u. gas (R. 73). It was explained .by subsequent
expert witnesses that this 648 b. t. u. gas would be "sweetened" with other gas and raised to the desired 875 b. t. u.
content \vhich is the b. t. u. content of the gas to be sold.
In collaboration with Mr. Gordon, Mr. Willson computed the reserves at Last Chance to be 104 billion cubic
feet of recoverable gas in place reduced to 98 billion cubic
feet of deliverable 875 b. t. u. gas (R. 83). Mr. Dorsey
Hager, called by Respondent, also testified to the reserves
at Last Chance. He thought Mr. Willson's estimates were
too conservative and estimated that in his opinion there
were 164 billion cubic feet in the Last Chance structure.
In making the estimate he employed the same volumetric
method employed by Willson and Gordon. His larger estimate was due to a difference in basic data. He thought
there was more acreage in the Last Chance structure than
Willson had estimated (R. 224-225).
In estimating the reserves at Monticello Mr. Willson
pointed out that the structure, unlike Boundary Butte and
Last Chance, could· not be considered proved so that accurate appraisals of the reserves could be made. Before
the structure could be classed as proved more exploratory
and development work would be necessary. He was certain,
however, that the large structure which lies east of Monticello contains tremendous quantities of commercial gas
which can be made available to the proposed pipe line if
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an adequate development and exploratory program is
launched. His reasons for believing that Monticello contains gas were: (1) It is adjacent to the proven reserves
in the Dove Creek structure which lies to the east in Colorado and is separated from that structure by a small
syncline. (2) The subsurface formations at Dove Creek
corrolate with the subsurface formations at Monticello.
( 3) The No. 1 Redd Well which was drilled at Monticello
found 1100 b. t. u. gas in the same formation and at approximately the same depth that 1100 b. t. u. gas was
found at Dove Creek. (4) The failure of the No. 1 Redd
Well to produce commercial quantities of natural gas was
due to a mechanical and not a structural failure (R. 92).
By employing very conservative estimates on the Monticello structure Mr. Willson and Mr. Gordon computed
682 billion cubic feet of natural gas in place at Monticello
and stated that 457 billion cubic feet of this gas, with a
b. t. u. content of 875 or better, could be placed in the
proposed line over a twenty year period ( R. 97) .
Relying only on the structures at Boundary Butte, Last
Chance and Monticello, Mr. Gordon and Mr. Willson computed, as shown in Exhibit 34, a total of 1 trillion, 134
billion cubic feet of recoverable reserves in the three structures and stated that from these recoverable reserves they
could withdraw over a twenty year period 816 billion cubic
feet of exc-ellent, high b. t. u. gas ( R. 1073) .
While Mr. Willson confined his estimates of rese·rves
to the three structures nam·ed, he further testified that
on his recommendation his client, Byrd-Frost, Inc., had
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acquired large holdings of acreage in southeastern Utah
in more than t'venty other structures and that in the event
a certificate should be granted to the Utah Natural Gas
Company he would recommend the immediate drilling of
many of these structures and extensive drilling and developing of the structures at Boundary Butte, Last Chance
and Monticello (R. 103). He had no question in his mind
that if a pipe line should be constructed as proposed that
there would be more than an ample supply of gas to fill
it (R. 140).
The other geologists corroborated and supplemented the
report of lVIr. \iVillson. Dr. Paul T. Walton confined his
attention to the Upper Schofield area which is located west
of Price and adjacent to the proposed line. This area was
referred to by Mr. Willson. Walton stated that there was
an excellent possibility of finding large reserves of commercial gas in the huge structures located in the area known
as Gordon Creek, Clear Creek, North Schofield, Flat Canyon and Joes Valley. He based his opinion on the following: (1) The well which was drilled on his recommendation by the Pacific vVestern at Gordon Creek encountered
inflammable gas in unknown quantities in the Dakota
Sandstone and, according to the log of the well, showed
some indications of gas in the Ferron, Morrison and Emery
sands. The well was not tested properly for gas because
its primary objective was oil and because it was. finally
completed as a commercial carbon dioxide well. Furthermore, gas is worthless unless there is a pipe line in the
vicinity. (2) The drilling of this well proved that the faulting in the area. had not destroyed the trap in the under-
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lying structure. ( 3) The area is strategically located between the Uintah and Paradox Basins and contains formations which are known to contain petroleum products
in Wyoming, New Mexico, Colorado and Utah. While this
area cannot be, of course, considered as a proved area, it
gives excellent promise as a potential producer of inflammable gas and, Dr. Walton testified, if the certificate is
granted and a pipe line constructed he would recommend
an immediate exploratory drilling of all five of these structures.
He further explained that in the event gas is found
in the Upper Schofield area it will be in tremendous quantities because of the hugeness of the structures. Depending upon how many formations, if any, would yield commercial gas the witness estimated the following possible
reserves: Flat Canyon, 105 to 400 billion cubic feet; Clear
Creek, 307 billion to 1 trillion cubic feet; North Schofield,
63 billion to 200 billion cubic feet; J oes Valley, 576 billion
to 2 trillion cubic feet. No estimate was made of the possible reserves at Gordon Creek (R. 202, 209, 211, 217).
The estimates made by Mr. Walton were in no way
relied upon by this Respondent and were produced for the
Commission's consideration only to show the great potential of the ar~.a, and to point out the need for a gas line
in the vicinity to stimulate further exploration and development.
Mr. Glen Ruby, who had been employed by the governments of Portugal, China, Chile, Argentina, and Cuba, and
who was then employed by the United States government
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in exploratory 'York on the Navy petroleun1 reserve in
Alaska, testified that in his opinion the Colorado River basin
area along the course of the proposed line in Southeastern
Utah offers the best oil and gas future of any other undeveloped area in the United States (R. 172-175, 186).
rvir. Ruby paid particular attention to the area around
the Big Flat structure which is located near the town of
Moab. The Big Flat, he explained, is located in the center
of the Paradox Basin where the subsurface formations have
reached a maximum thickness. The well which was drilled
at the Big Flat by Tidewater indicated the presence of gas
and oil, but because of low pressure in the area these
products were effectively mudded off by the mud used in
the rotary drill process (R. 184-187). Mr. Ruby and his
associates propose to drill a well in this structure with a
cable tool rig and expect excellent possibilities of obtaining
large quantities of commercial gas. Such gas, if found,
will go either to the California or the Utah market depending on which way the first pipe line is constructed (R.
189).
Mr. Robert E. Landon, who is in charge of the geophysical work of General Petroleum in Idaho, Utah, Arizona, Nevada, and Southeastern Colorado, indicated to the
Commission that his company is actively interested in the
construction of the proposed pipe line in Southeastern Utah
because of its activity in that area where it is presently
drilling for petroleum products and where it hopes to have
a means of transporting gas to market in the event the
same is found in commercial quantities (R. 313-315).
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Both Mr. Byrd and Mr. Frost, who are partners in
Byrd-Frost, Inc., and who are geologists, testified that they
had in the past backed up the recommendations of their
geologists, particularly Mr. Willson, and as a result had
obtained large holdings of acreage in twenty some odd
structures in the State of Utah. They expressed a willingness to spend 5 to 10 million dollars drilling and developing
these structures if the Commission granted the application
for a certificate (R. 912, 920, 940). The attorneys for the
Mountain Fuel Supply Company raised some question relative to the ability of Byrd-Frost, Inc., to undertake such a
large scale program. At the Commission's request Mr.
Byrd produced a financial statement showing that ByrdFrost, Inc., had a net worth in excess of 32 million dollars
(R. 726, 1099).
John R. Fell, a general partner in the banking house
of Lehman Bros. in New York City, was asked the following question and gave the following answer: Question.
"Have you any opinion as an investment banker as to
whether Byrd-Frost have got the ability to do that testing
job?" Answer. "Well, I wish I was in as good position
as they are to do it. There is no question in my mind that
they have got the ability to do it" (R. 450). The record
shows that Mr. Byrd and Mr. Frost, operating as ByrdFrost, Inc., presently own and operate more than 500 producing oil and gas wells in the United States (R. 911).
There was also some suggestion made that the plan
proposed by the Applicant and supported by Byrd-Frost,
Inc., was a promotion scheme and that Byrd-Frost, Inc.,
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would make a public offering of stock. In answer to this
suggestion the two partners testified that they have never
sold stock for any enterprise in which they have been interested and that they do not anticipate selling stock for
the drilling and development of gas in Utab ( R. 910) .
It appears from Exhibits 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, and
54 that this Respondent has a call on all the gas to be produced by Byrd-Frost, Inc., Paul B. English, Four Corners
Oil Company, Morgan-Walton Oil Company, Last Chance
Holding Company, Americol Petroleum Company and Cane
Creek Oil Company. It also appears that Shell Oil Company and General Petroleum Company are willing and
anxious to make arrangements for the sale of any gas they
may obtain in the area to the Respondent company (R. 1085,
1086, 1087, 1088, 1089, 1090, and 1093). All of the parties
named own acreage in Southeastern and central Utah. For
this reason all who were asked testified that they were
anxious that the proposed intrastate line be constructed so
that they would have a market for Utah produced gas, and
all indicated that the construction of such a line would
stimulate development.
Appellant called two expert witnesses, Mr. Dougherty
and Mr. Davis. Mr. Dougherty had never been on the Last
Chance property and had not been on the Boundary Butte
or Monticello property for at least eight years, during
which time all of the existing wells on those structures had
been drilled (R. 683). Mr. Davis had not at any time been
on any of the structures identified by this Respondent.
Neither had actively participated in the discovery of any
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oil or gas well (R. 709). Nevertheless, they disagreed with
some of the testimony given by the seven geologists. who
testified for this Respondent.
3.
neering
gories:
natural

Feasibility and tke Engineering Plan--The engiof the proposed project falls into two logical cate(a) Transporting, treating and processing of the
gas; (b) construction of the proposed line.

Transporting, Treating, and Processing of the
Natural Gas-Mr. Melvin Gertz, a qualified technical petroleum engineer and an associate of Robert L. Purvin, consulting engineers of Dallas, testified to a detailed study
made by himself and his associates of the proposed operation of the line. His study is outlined in Exhibits 43 and
44 (R. 1082-1083). His testimony dealt in detail with the
analysis, processing, mixing and transporting of gas from
Boundary Butte, Monticello and Last Chance through the
pipe line to the distributing facilities enroute and to the
Provo-Salt Lake industrial area (R. 317). His analysis and
study, which is technical and detailed in nature, was not
questioned by any of the protestants or by Appellant.
(a)

(b) Construction of the Proposed Line-The location
of the proposed route and the study relating to the costs of
the proposed line and the details relative to the actual construction were supplied by Mr. H. H. Allen and Mr. Joseph
C. Gordon, both civil engineers from Dallas, Texas. From
first hand experience and as. a result of studies which they
had made they testified that the proposed line was feasible
and that its total cost, including all the necessary facilities,
would approximate, before adding overhead and interest,
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$29,064,920.00 The technical aspects of this testimony were
broken down into a detailed study which is set out in Exhibit 42 at page 1081 of the record. The estimates made
by Mr. Allen and Mr. Gordon were not questioned.

Feasibn.ity of the Financial Plan-Mr. William
Merten, a certified public accountant and a partner of the
firm of Merten, Smyer & Kernaghan, Dallas, Texas, testified that he had been employed by the Utah Natural Gas
Company. to make a financial study and report for the
proposed pipe line venture. He obtained his estimated cost
of facilities, supplies, and operation from Mr. H. H. Allen
and Mr. J. C. Gordon. Based on a supply of 100,000 cubic
feet of gas per day selling at an industrial price of 23o/4
cents and a gate price to retailers of 30 cents and projecting
the performance over a twenty year period he formulated
the financial plan set out in this Respondent's. Exhibit 42
(R. 1081). He computed that the over all estimate cost
would be a little less than $32,000,000.00. This financial
plan had been submitted to Lehman Bros. Banking House
of New York City. Two representatives of that hous.e, Mr.
John R. Fell, a partner, and Mr. R. Raymond Rusmisel,
explained that they had been consulted and had made a
study of the venture and desired to undertake its complete
financing providing ( 1) that the Commission would issue
a certificate of convenience and necessity; {2) that their
independent geologists, after such certificate had been
granted, approved the estimates of Applicant's geologists
and determined that the reserves were sufficient to justify
the expenditure of $32,000,000.00. They testified that more
-1.
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than a preliminary investigation had been made and that
Lehman Bros. had concluded that the project in its fundamental nature was feasible (R. 444).
Both Mr. Fell and Mr. Rusmisel indicated the financial proposals at the present stage of the proceedings were
contingent and necessarily preliminary because of the necessity of doing further development work and of obtaining a certificate of convenience and necessity.
In summary, then, these facts appear: There is an
unsupplied demand for natural gas in the central industrial
area of Utah, . adequate to justify the construction of the
line proposed by the Respondent. The construction of such
a line is feasible from the standpoint of economics, engineering and finance. Responsible financing for the line
is available upon the proof of adequate gas reserves. Competent geologists produced by this Respondent estimate the
gas reserves to be adequate; the Appellant's geologists contend to the contrary. The proof of reserves can only be
determined by extensive drilling. Such drilling will require the expenditure of several million dollars. Gas, un·
like oil, can only move to market by pipe line. Those in
control of the gas structures relied upon for supply will
not risk their money on the necessary exploration without
assurance that if and when the gas is brought above ground
a pipe line in the hands of friendly interests will be available to take it to market; in short, that the Respondent,
Utah Natural Gas Company, have a certificate of convenience and necessity for the construction and operation of
the proposed line.
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Upon these facts this Respondent voluntarily proposed as a reasonable and appropriate solution of the problems presented in this proceeding that the Commission
grant to Utah Natural Gas Company the certificate of convenience and necessity prayed for by it, but impose condition upon the exercise of such right ( R. 1004) . This the
Commission did.

STATEMENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON
POINT I.
THE CONDITIONAL ORDER MADE WAS
WITHIN THE JURISDICTION AND POWER
OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
THE STATE OF UTAH.

POINT II.
THE CONDITIONAL ORDER MADE IS REASONABLE AND IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST.

POINT III.
THE APPELLANT IS NOT A PARTY AGGRIEVED BY THE ORDER HEREIN APPEALED FROM.
POINT IV.
THE CONDITIONAL ORDER MADE BY THE
COMMISSION· DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DUE
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PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE FEDERAL OR
ST'ATE CONSTITUTION AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF
POWER T·O AN UNNAMED GEOLOGIST AND
DOES NOT PERMIT A FINDING ON A MATERIAL FACT BASED SOLELY ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
POINT V.
THE COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT THE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE STATE IS DESIRABLE IS
A PROPER FINDING AND IS NOT ONE
WHICH INDICATES A FAILURE TO REGULARLY PURSUE ITS STATUTORY AUTHORITY.
POINT VI.
THE COMMISSION DID NOT EXCEED ITS
LAWFUL AUTHORITY IN HEARING THE APPLICATION OF THE UTAH NATURAL GAS
COMPANY BEFORE IT HEARD THE APPLICATION O·F APPELLANT.
POINT VII.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
. UTAH DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY AND
CAPRICIOUSLY IN NOT HAVING A FU.LL
JOINT HEARING BEFORE THE FEDERAL
POWER COMMISSION BEF.ORE RULING ON
RESPONDENT·'S APPLICATION.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE CONDITIONAL ORDER MADE WAS
\VITHIN THE JURISDICTION AND POWER
OF THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
THE STATE OF UTAH.
Section 76-4-1, Utah c·ode Annotated 1943, provides
as follows:
"The commission is hereby vested with power
and jurisdiction to supervise and regulate every
public utility in this state, and to supervise all of the
business of every such public utility in this state, and
to do all things, whether herein specifically designated or in addition thereto, which are necessary or
convenient in the exercise of such power and jurisdiction." (Italics ours.)
Section 76-4-24, Utah Code Annotated 1943, deals specifically with the general subject of certificates of convenience and necessity. The pertinent parts of that statute are
as follows:
" ( 3) Every applicant for such a certificate
shall file in the office of the commission such evidence as shall be required by the commission to show
that such applicant has received the required consent, franchise or permit of the proper county, city,
municipal or other public authority. The commission shall have power, after a hearing, to issue said
certificate as prayed for or to refuse to issue the
same, or to issue it for the construction of a portion
only of the contemplated railroad, street railroad,
aerial bucket tramway, line, plant or syste·m, or extension thereof, or for the partial exercise only of
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said right or privilege and may attach to the exercise of the rights granted by said certificate such
terms and conditions as in its judgment public convenience and necessity may require." (Italics ours.)
It thus appears clearly that the legislature has delegated to the Public Service Commission alone the right
to impose in its order "such terms and conditions as in its
judgment public convenience and necessity may require,"
and to do whatever is "necessary or convenient" in the exercise of such power. The legislature has not attempted to
limit, qualify, or define the type of condition which may
be imposed. Nor are we able to find any cases under a
similar statute wherein a court has attempted to limit the
nature of the condition, precedent or subsequent, which a
commission may invoke.
We submit that 76-4-24 and 76-4-1 contain definite and
clear grants of power to the Commission to deal with the
specific problem presented in the instant case. An analysis
of the language of Section 24, supra, clearly shows that the
procedure contemplated is that the Commission may issue
a certificate and attach to the authority thereby granted
terms and conditions whick it sees fit to impose.
By virtue of the general power thus given, every
order granting power or authority to a utility contains
conditions implied by law which, if not adhered to, may
subject the order to modification or revocation. Almost
every order of the Commission contains express provisions
or conditions subsequent to its granting which must be
complied with by the applicant. These relate to filings of
tariffs, policies of insurance, installation, maintenance and
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operation of interlocking and other safety devices, evidence
of the consummation of transactions authorized in acquisition cases, and compliance with required accounting practice and procedure. It is interesting in this regard to note
that even in the cases cited by Appellant conditions subsequent were attached to the Commission order. Thus, in Re
Wilcox, cited at page 21 of Appellant's brief P. U. R.
1916 C, the Commission provided that the certificate
granted would become null and void unless. construction
was commenced not later than the first day of June and
unless petitioners should have available all equipment and
pipe necessary for the sale, manufacture and transportation
of gas not later than the first day of October, 1917.
Surely, in view of the language of the statute, a Court
cannot properly hold that the imposing of a condition subsequent invalidates a commission order. The only test of
the validity of the order is not whether it is conditional but
whether or not there is evidence to support it or whether
it violates any constitutional rights of the Appellant or
arbitrarily discriminates against the Appellant. Our statutes and decisions dealing with the power of the Supreme
Court to review decisions of the Public Service Commission so provide. 76-6-16, Utah Code Annotated, 1943, in
its pertinent provisions is as follows:

"* * * within thirty days after the rendition of the decision on rehearing, the applicant or
any party to the proceeding deeming himself aggrieved * * * may apply to the Supreme Court
for a writ of certiorari for the purpose of having the
Iawfulness of the original order or decision * * *
inquired into and determined. * * * The review
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shall not be extended further than to determine
whether the commission has regularly pursued its
authority including a determination of whether the
order or decision under review violates any right of
the petitioner under the constitution of the United
States or of the State of Utah. The findings and
conclusions of the commission on questions of fact
shall be final and shall not be subject to review.
Such questions of fact shall include ultimate facts
and the findings and conclusions of the commission
on reasonableness and discrimination."
The legislature has thus limited the right of the Supreme Court to interfere with the judgment and discretion
of the Public Service Commission to those cases wherein
the Commission has failed to regularly pursue its authority
or has violated a right of the appellant under the constitu-.
tion of the United States or the State of Utah. The legislature has further provided that findings of fact, including findings and conclusions as to reasonableness and discrimination, are final and not subject to review.
Our Supreme Court in confining itself to the foregoing
limited power of review has respected the legislature's obvious intent and has interfered very little with the Public
Service Commission's findings on facts, including its determination of what is reasonable, or what is discriminatory.
In one of the first cases, Jeremy Fuel & Grain Co., et
al. v. Public Utilities Com.mission, 63 Utah 392, 226 P.
456, the Fuel Company brought an action before the Commission against The Denver and Rio Grande Western Railroad Company seeking reparations on coal shipments. on
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the grounds that the freight charged by the railroad was
excessive both as a matter of reasonableness and as a matter of la\Y. The Supreme Court of the State of Utah, In
sustaining the Commission action, said:
''It is important to keep in mind the provisions
of our statute relating to that subject. Comp. Laws
of Utah 1917, Section 4834, where the powers of
this court to review the decisions of the commission
are enumerated, provides:" (Citing 76-6-15, Utah
Code Annotated 1943, supra.)
"Here, thus, is a clear, explicit and unambiguous statement of both the power and the limits of
that power. Beyond that ~ve cannot go."
In Los Angeles & Salt Lake Railroad Company v.
Public Utilities Commission of Utah, et al., which came
pefore the Supreme Court on two occasions, and as two
separate cases, 80 Utah 455, 15 P. (2d) 358 and 81 Utah
286, 17 P. (2d) 287, there is some helpful language on the
question now before this Court. The two decisions were
written by Judge Wolfe, who at that time was a district
court judge but who was sitting by invitation on the Supreme Court. The question in general was whether or not
petitioner should be permitted to change its stations from
an agency to non agency stations. Judge Wolfe in his first
opinion said :
"Technically stated, our power of review goes to
the extent of determining whether there was any
substantial evidence to support the decision of the
commission. * * *"
Petitioner, in its argument, had relied on certain New
Mexico cases. The Judge pointed out that these decisions
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were not helpful as the New Mexico Supreme Court had
the power to review the reasonableness and lawfulness of
an order made by the State Corporation Commission and
was not bound by the findings of that commission. Judge
Wolfe said:

"* * * If the power of this court to review
the proceedings and the evidence before the commission were the same as given to the Supreme Court
. of New Mexico, we could review the evidence and
determine whether in our opinion the commission's
judgment was correct, and we could determine from
the evidence itself, as if the question had been before this court for the first time, whether the application of the railroad should not be granted. Under the New Mexico procedure, the commission on
appeal is considered analogous to a referee taking
testimony and submitting recommendations. The
court rnay or may not follow the recommendations;
its judgment operates directly on the evidence and
not on the decision of the commission. But we cannot do that under the provisions of section 4834."
(Italics ours.)
The Judge pointed out that the right of the Court to
review a Commission finding was similar to its right to
review the finding of a jury. He said:

"* * *

A court must not set aside a verdict
merely because it disagrees with the verdict, but
orily if it is such that the court could say that no
person in a reasonable state of mind, free from passion, bias, or prejudice, following the principles of
law given it, could have so found under the evidence.
This court must not determine whether its supposedly reasonable minds differ from the minds of the
commission in the exercise of their judging facul-
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ties, but 'vhether any reasonable mind could have
agreed with the decision in view of the law and the
evidence.~' (Italics ours.)
Elaborating further on this same question, Judge
'Volfe, in the second case, wrote :

"* * * If there is any evidence upon which
any reasonable judging mind could come to the same
conclusion that the commission came to it would be
our duty to affirm the decision of the comrruss1on.

* * *"
The Judge also paid his respects to the value of precedents from other jurisdictions on the question of reasonableness of the Commission action. He wrote in his first opinion:

"* * *

Furthermore, since the commission
has the duty to exercise its ovvn judgment on the
facts, the opinion of no court on similar facts can
be a precedent. * * *"
This last statement is especially applicable to the authorities cited by the Appellant from other jurisdictions,
primarily those cited under Point (a) of Point 1 of Appellant's brief. Thus, in Re Wilcox, P. U. R. 1916 C (Idaho),
page 21 Appellant's brief, Re Achtenburg, 8 P. U. R. New
Series 397 (Mo.), page 27 Appellant's brief, Re Grand
Rapids Gas Light Co., 13 P. U. R. New Series 445 (Mich.),
page 30 Appellant's brief, Re Tennessee Gas & Transportation Co., 40 P. U. R. ~Jew Series 129 (Tenn.), page 31
Appellant's brief, and several Federal Power Commission
cases, opinions of the respective tribunals are given respecting their judgments as to what is reasonable under

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

26
entirely different facts and circumstances than in the instant case. Following the suggestion of Judge Wolfe, we
submit that Appellant might as well cite the jury verdicts
from other cases to prove that a jury verdict in a given
situation is wrong.
The foregoing decisions cannot be helpful unless they
indicate that the action taken by the Public Service Commission of Utah, in the case now before this Court, was
not "regularly pursued" or that the order made violates
some constitutional right of the Appellant or in some way
is arbitrary and capricious. We do not find language
which so indicates in the cases cited by Appellant.
In the Wilcox case, supra, the dispute before the Idaho
Public Service Commission was between two applicants
who had filed within one month of each other seeking a
certificate to serve Idaho Falls with manufactured gas.
Both applicants appeared against the other in opposition.
The Commission held a joint hearing and granted a certificate to one of the petitioners. This certificate, as herein
indicated, had attached to it conditions subsequent which
rendered the order null and void if the conditions were
not complied with. True, the Commission did employ language indicating that the unsuccessful applicant seemed
to have no plan and was "purely a promoter." But how
does this language in any way bear upon the issue in the
instant case? There is no promotion involved in the case
at bar; in fact, promotion of any type is. specifically enjoined by the Commission's order. Furthermore, the financial plan suggested by the Utah Natural Gas Company
was endorsed as sound and feasible by Lehman Bros., one
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of the outstanding banking houses in this country ; finally
there is nothing in the language used indicating the Utah
Commission is without authority to do what it did.
In Re .4.chtenburg, supra, the applicant seeking a certificate consisted of a group of individuals, without corporate form, who proposed tentatively and conditionally
to obtain borrowed capital for the purchase of a defunct
railroad and to sell preferred and common stock in a proposed corporation to be later organized. It further proposed to seek permission from the Missouri Commission to
borrow funds from the Reconstruction Finance Corporation or some other source to finance the purchase of the
proposed property based on a mortgage on that property
which it had not yet acquired. The Missouri Court felt the
plan was too tentative to grant a tentative certificate. We
can only agree, but query, wherein does this case bear upon
the present issue?
In Re Grand Rapids Gas Co., supra, a Michigan Commission permitted an existing public utility operating on
public financing to build a pipe line from a new field into
the City of Grand Rapids. It appears from the evidence
that there were not enough probable reserves in the new
area to serve the city with 100% natural gas for a period
of more than four years. However, the evidence showed
that by mixing the natural gas with 50% artificial gas. the
company could serve Grand Rapids for a period of about
eight years. On the basis of this limited showing of reserves the appellant was permitted by the Michigan Commission to build the line. Surely this case relied upon by
Appellant does not support its apparent position that this
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Respondent has failed to show adequate reserves. The important fact which Appellant apparently does not recognize is that Respondent company is not claiming adequate
reserves for an unconditional certificate. It is claiming
an adequate showing to support the conditional order made.
Some of the language used by the Michigan Commission
is very applicable. Thus, at page 451 the Commission said:

"* * *

It must be kept in mind that the
Grand Rapids Gas Light Company is a public Utility and its funds can be expended only where the
Commission finds that such expenditure is reasonable and logical and will serve the public convenience and necessity."
The Utah Natural Gas Company does not propose to
use public funds and is prevented from doing so by the
Commission's conditional order.
At page 462 of the opinion the Michigan Commission,

in justifying the construction of the line on the basis of
meager reserves, said :

"* * * Opinions have been expressed that
the building of a pipe line is not warranted except
when a sufficient reserve is actually proven to supply the community to be served for a period of eight
or ten years. This has not been and necessarily must
not be a fixed rule, but depends on many conditiom.
For example, the distance of the community from
the field as relating to the construction investment,
the possibilities of further discovery, the possibilities for development of usage which diffe-rs greatly
according to the type of community. * * *" (Italics ours.)
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\Ve submit that the present order of the Utah Commission, because of its conditional nature, is more conservative than the unconditional order of the Michigan Commission in the Grand Rapids case relied upon by Appellant.
Furthermore, the Michigan Commission expressly disapproves the Appellant's fundamental contention that the
Utah Commission has no jurisdiction to make a conditional
order similar to the one made in the instant case.
In Incorporators of Service Gas Company v. Public
Service Commission of Pennsylvania, 126 Pa. Super. Ct.
381, 190 A. 653, page 35 Appellant's brief, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court had before it for review a decision of the
Pennsylvania Public Service Commission denying to petitioners a certificate to serve natural gas in an area already
adequately served by four existing gas companies. The
Superior Court of Pennsylvania Sll;Stained the Commission's
ruling and said at page 262 :

"* * * The record discloses no inadequacy
of service in the territories served by the respective
protestants and included in appellant's application.
There is no testimony upon which such a finding
could be based; and, on the contrary, the testimony
of appellants and the protesting companies was consistently to the effect that they knew of no one in
the territory in question who had demanded gas and
was unable to secure it. * * *"
Surely this case cannot be helpful in deciding the problems existing in the State of Utah. In this state we not
only have an admitted inadequate service in the area served
by the Mountain Fuel Supply Company, but there is a total
lack of any service in most areas of the state.
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In Re Kansas Pipe Line & Gas Co. and Re North
Dakota Consumers Gas Co., 30 P. U. R. (N. S.) 321, page
34 of Appellant's brief, two applicants were seeking permission to construct interstate ga.s lines from Kansas and
Montana to certain specified towns, in eastern North Dakota and western Minnesota. The hearing was before the
Federal Power Commission and was the first case to arise
under the Federal Natural Gas Act Section 7(c) 15 U.S.
C. A., sec. 717g. (c), which provided among other things
the following:

"* * * In passing on applications for certificates of convenience and necessity, the Commission shall give due consideration to the applicant's
ability to render and maintain adequate service at
rates lower than those prevailing in the territory to
he served, it being the intention of Congress that
natural gas shall be sold in interstate commerce for
resale for ultimate public consumption for domestic,
commercial, industrial, or any other use at the lowest
possible reasonable rate consistent with the maintenance of adequate service in the public interest."
In discussing the Kansas company's application the
Federal Power Commission pointed out that it did not
appear from the evidence that the Kansas company had
a firm commitment to purchase gas at the Hugotan Field
in Kansas. The Commission therefore said at page 333:

"* * * We could not issue an unconditional
certificate of public convenience and necessity nor
authorize the issuance of such an unconditional certificate until we had received assurance in the form
of a contract satisfactory to us that the reserve of
natural gas purportedly available to the Kansas
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Company is actually available upon firm commitment." (Italics ours.)
It was interesting to observe that the Federal Power
Commission retained jurisdiction of the two cases so that
further evidence could be introduced.
\Ve do not believe that cases decided before the Federal Power Commission involving inte!pretation of the
Natural Gas Act and involving interstate transportation of
natural gas can limit this Court in determining the power
of the Public Service Commission of Utah to issue the conditional order here in question. The Kansas and North
Dakota cases are particularly inapp-licable inasmuch as the
Federal Power Commission expressly stated that it could
not issue an unconditional certificate in that case. We do
not claim that the Utah Commission could properly issue
an unconditional certificate in the instant case, nor did it
do so.
POINT II.
THE CONDITIONAL ORDER MADE IS REASONABLE AND IN THE PUBLIC INTEREST.
It seems to us that the Commission's problem, fundamentally and simply stated, was as. follows:
The evidence showed an admitted inadequate supply
of natural gas in the State of Utah and a real public need
to augment this inadequate supply. The possible sources
of an additional supply were:
1.

The Mountain Fuel Supply Company.

2.

New Mexico reserves to be served by the Utah
Pipe Line Company.
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3.

Utah reserves to be supplied by the Utah Natural
Gas Company.

From which of these sources did the Commission have
the best possibility of obtaining additional gas?
The Mountain Fuel Supply admitted that it would be
unable to adequately serve the domestic and industrial needs
of the northern part of the state now or in the foreseeable future.
The Utah Pipe Line Company had not obtained a certificate of convenience and necessity from the Federal
Power Con1mission and it might not be able to do so. Until
it obtained such a certificate there was no possibility of
obtaining gas from that source. The obtaining of a certificate from the Federal Power Commission was and is problematical. In any event before such a certificate could be
obtained, several years might elapse. Furthermore, New
Mexico gas if brought into the State of Utah would either
cause undeveloped Utah gas to remain in the ground or go
to the Southern California market.
Several private drillers. and producers with large holdings of Utah acreage agreed to spend their own money
developing Utah gas in the southeastern portion of the
state and believed that they could prove up a sufficient
supply 'vithin a year to justify the construction of the line
proposed by this Respondent, provided that the Commission would assure them by issuing a certificate that the
intrastate line would be constructed if they were successful.
Confronted 'vith these facts, the Commission apparently determined that the best chance of obtaining more
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natural gas was to accept the proposal made by the Utah
Natural Gas Company and its sponsors. However, in order
to protect the public, and to protect the Utah Pipe Line
Co1npany, in the event it sincerely intended to make good
its application before the Federal Power Commission, the
Commission limited the Utah Natural Gas Company to one
year, and in effect said: If you develop a sufficient proved
supply from the estimated large reserves in the State of
Utah within one year you may build the line as proposed
and will be protected in doing so. If you do not, your conditional rights will be void. In the meantime you may not
make a public offering of stock.
Surely such a decision is reasonable, and surely no one,
not even the Appellant, can reasonably complain. If this
Respondent is unable to comply with the conditions within
a year's time, Appellant has not been hurt and the public
will be greatly benefited. The only one who stands to lose
if this Respondent fails, is this Respondent and private
producers who desire to spend their own money.
We submit that this Court, or any other reasonable
body, faced with the problems which confronted the Public
Service Con1mission of the State of Utah would have had
no alternative but to issue the certificate as given.

POINT III.
THE APPELLANT IS NOT A PARTY AGGRIEVED BY THE ORDER HEREIN APPEALED FROM.
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We believe it is pertinent to point out that not only
has Appellant no pipe line, facilities, customers or public
duty within the State of Utah but that inasmuch as it proposes to transport natural gas in interstate commerce, its
power and authority to engage in any of its proposed functions cannot in the first instance be granted or conferred
by the Respondent, Public Service Commission of Utah,
but must be granted, if at all, by the Federal Power Commission, upon which body, by the Natural Gas Act of 1938
[Chapter 15 (b), Title 15, U. S. C. A.] is conferred jurisdiction over the interstate transportation of natural gas.
Appellant alleges that it has filed an application before the Federal Power Commission seeking authority to
transport natural gas from the State of New Mexico into
the State of Utah. Whether that application may be prosecuted or what the ultimate disposition of that proceeding
may be is purely conjectural; but until and unless that
application is prosecuted and the authority sought thereunder is granted, the Appellant, Utah Pipe Line Company,
has at the most only a remote and contingent interest in
the proceedings taken before the Public ~ervice Commission of Utah and in the order and decision from which it
takes its appeal.
There is no right on the part of any person, whether
or not a party or participant in a proceeding before the
Commission, to invoke the jurisdiction of this court. Such
right is limited by statute to persons who are aggrieved
by the order or decision complained of. The matter is
controlled by Section 76-6-16, U. C. A. 1943,. wl1.ich provides in part as follows:
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"Within thirty days after the application for a
rehearing is denied, or, if the application is granted,
within thirty days after the rendition of the decision
on rehearing, the applicant or any party to the proceeding deeming himself aggrieved by such order
or decision rendered upon rehearing may apply to
the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari for the
purpose of having the lawfulness of the original
order or decision, or the order or decision on rehearing, inquired into and determined."
The question here presented, then, is whether the Appellant is a party aggrieved within the meaning of the above
statute. It is elementary that only a person having a legal
standing before this court enjoys the right to challenge the
order or decision of an administrative body. The statutes
of the several states and the United States are not uniform
in defining who enjoys a legal standing before a court under
such circumstances. Some statutes refer to persons entitled to challenge an administrative order as persons "adversely affected", others refer to persons having "a legal
standing", while some statutes employ the same language
as that of our Code, limiting the right to persons "aggrieved". Regardless of the language employed, however,
the principles controlling the right of challenge are essentially uniform in the decisions of the courts of the various
states and of the United States.
The general rule as developd in the decision on this
question seems to be this: In order for a party to be entited to challenge a decision of an administrative body,
the order or decision complained of must have an immed-
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iate, direct and material effect upon the then existing
rights or property of the complaining party.
The right of a party to challenge a decision of an administrative body has so often been considered by the
Supreme Court of the United States in connection with
orders and decisions of the Interstate Commerce Commission and other regulatory bodies that we believe the decisions of that Court will be particularly helpful to this
Court in considering the problem here presented. We therefore direct the attention of the Court to certain of those
decisions. Perhaps the leading case in the field is Federal
Pow-er Commission, et al. v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 64 S.
Ct. 281. In that decision the Rochester Telephone Corporation case, infra, was referred to in connection with
the power of a party to challenge an order or decision of
any regulatory body, and the court, in connection with the
power of the Federal Power Commission, at page 295 said
in part:
"The Court recently summarized the various
types of administrative action or determination reviewable as orders under the Urgent Deficiencies
Act of October 22, 1913, 28 U. S. C. Sees. 45, 47a,
28 U. S. C. A. Sees. 45, 4 7a, and kindred statutory
provisions. Rochester Tel. Corp. v. United States,
307 U. S. 125, 59 S. Ct. 754, 83 L. Ed. 1147. It was
there pointed out that where 'the order sought to be
reviewed does not of itself adversely affect complainant but only affects his rights adversely on the
contingency of future administrative action', it is
not reviewable. * * * The Court said, 'In view
of traditional conceptions of federal judicial power.
resort to the courts in these situations is either premature or wholly beyond their province.'"
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In ]}Joffat Tunnel League, et ol. v. United States, 53
S. Ct. 543, an action was brought by Moffat Tunnel League
against the United States and others to set aside an order
of the Interstate Commerce Commission. In affirming a
decree dismissing the petition the Court, at page 545, said:

* *

the complaint must show that plaintiff has, or represents others having, a legal right
or interest that will be injuriously affected by the
order. (Citing among other cases Edward Hines
Yellow Pine Trustees v. United States, 44 S. Ct. 72.)
Plaintiffs have failed to show that they are so qualified."
"*

In RochesteT Telephone Corporation v. United States,
59 S. Ct. 754, suit was brought in equity by the Telephone
Corporation against the United States and the Federal
Communications CQmmission to review an order of that
Commission. The bill was dismissed by the lower court
and dismissal affirmed on appeal in the Supreme Court.
Justice Frankfurter, speaking for that court, reviews the
circumstances under which an order of an administrative
body may be reviewed or attacked by a party deeming
himself aggrieved.
In L. Singer & Sons, et al. v. Union Pacific Railroad
Company, 61 S. Ct. 254, the court had occasion to affirm
the order of the Circuit Court of Appeals dismissing a
complaint. The facts in this case were that the complainants were con1mission merchants doing business in one
city who would be adversely affected by the construction
into another city of a railroad extension involved in the

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

38
case. The Supreme Court at page 257 quotes from the
decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals as follows:
"The plaintiffs have no definite legal right
which is threatened. They are, however, persons
whose welfare may be adversely affected by the
bringing about of a material change in the transportation situation, in the sense that the extension
proposed by the defendant, if built and operated,
will enable a competitive market to function to their
detriment. In that sense, we think it may safely be
said that the proposed extension of defendant's lines
may adversely affect the plaintiffs' we1fare. We are
of the opinion, however, that their complaint discloses that their welfare cannot be directly, but only
indirectly and consequentially, affected by the proposed extension. They are not in competition with
the defendant. They are not engaged in the transportation business. Their only peculiar interest in
that business is in the effect which changes in it may
have upon the market where they do business and
upon rival markets now or hereafter established in
the territory which the plaintiffs serve. * * *
We conclude that the statute is not to be so liberally
construed as to enable those who fear adverse effects
upon their business from the establishment of competitive enterprises requiring transportation facilities to maintain suits to enjoin railroads from constructing what are claimed to be unauthorized extensions to serve such enterprises."
The Court finally, at page 258, concludes as follows:

"* * * a suit cannot be instituted by an
individual unless he 'possesses something more than
a common concern for obedience to law.' The general or common interest finds protection in the permission to sue granted to public authorities. An
individual may have some special and peculiar in-
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terest \vhich may be directly and materially affected
by alleged unlawful action. See Detroit & M. Ry. v.
Boyne City, etc., Co., D. C. 286 F. 5-10. If such circumstances are shown he may sue ; he is then 'party
in interest' within the meaning of the statute. In
the absence of these circumstances he is not such a
party."
In Alabama Po~ver Co. v. I ekes, et al., 58 S. Ct. 300,
the Power Company sought to enjoin Ickes as Federal
Emergency Administrator of Public Works and others from
the execution of certain loan-and-grant agreements entered
into with municipalities. The Court, in stating the contention of the petitioner, at page 302 said:
"The injury which petitioner will suffer, it is
contended, is the loss of its business as a result of
the use of the loans and grants by the municipalities
in setting up and maintaining rival and competing
plants; a result, it is further contended, which will
be directly caused by the unlawful act of the administrator in making and consummating the loan-andgrant agreements."
In stating its conclusion on the same page, the court said:
"On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, that court found
it unnecessary to consider the validity of the loans
and grants, and affirmed the decrees of the District
Court dismissing the bills on the ground that no
legal or equitable right of the power company had
been invaded, and the company, therefore, was without standing to challenge the validity of the administrator's acts. 91 F. 2d 303. With that view we
agree, and confine our consideration of the cases accordingly."
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'resting the position of the Appellant here in the light
of the rules laid down in the foregoing cases, it appears
clear that it is not a party aggrieved within the meaning
of our statute. The Appellant stands in the position of a
party asserting only an expectancy to engage in a competitive enterprise. Appellant enjoys a complete freedom
of election to change or abandon any intended plan or
enterprise at any time for it is neither under the jurisdiction or control of the Respondent Commission nor any
other commission. It has within the State of Utah no property, customers, investments or market to protect. It owes
no duty of public service to anyone. A clearer case for
invoking the principles announced in the foregoing decisions could hardly be found.
In Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Federal Power
Commission et al., 113 F. (2d) 281, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals reviewed the decision of the Federal
Power Commission granting to the Louisiana Nevada Transit Company a certificate of convenience and necessity
under the Natural Gas Act. The Appellant claimed that
there was not a proper showing of public convenience and
necessity and that the order contained conditions as to
rates which were beyond the power of the Federal Power
Commission to impose. The Circuit Court in sustaining
the decision of the Federal Power Commission said at
page 283:

"* * * Finally, we find nothing in the statute which prevents the commission from imposing
in the interest of the public to be served by the
construction, reasonable conditions upon the granting of a certificate of convenience and necessity,
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and we cannot ag·ree with petitioner that their imposition in any manner effects or impairs the certificate.
"But, if we could abstractly agree, this would
not avail petitioner, for it is aggrieved, not by the
in1posed conditions, but by the granting of the permit and under the statute, it may complain here
only of an order by which it is aggrieved."
It appears to us that this language is especially applicable to Appellant's position before this Court. The con.
not the Respondent
ditions imposed restrict the . L\.ppellant,
company. They are in effect for Appellant's protection as
well as for the protection of the general public. What Appellant is in reality objecting to is that this Respondent,
during the period of the conditional order, will have an
opportunity to deliver sufficient proven reserves to commence the construction of the proposed gas line. If this
Respondent fails to do so because of the conditions imposed,
Appellant will have no cause to complain and can pursue
its application before the Federal Power Commission.
POINT IV.
THE CONDITIONAL ORDER MADE BY THE
COMMISSION DOES NOT VIOLATE THE DUE
PROCESS CLAUSE OF T·HE F'EDERAL OR
STATE CONSTITUTION AND DOES NOT CONSTITUTE AN UNLAWFUL DELEGATION OF
POWER TO AN UNNAl\iED GEOLOGIST AND
DOES NOT PERMIT A FINDING ON A MATERIAL FACT BASED SOLELY ON HEARSAY EVIDENCE.
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The Appellant throughout its brief continually asserts
that the Commission found there were inadequate reserves
in Southeastern Utah to justify the construction of the
proposed line. This is not true. At page 1210 of the record the Commission made the following finding:
"The Commission further finds that the estimated reserves in the area where the applicant has
gas purchase contracts are sufficient, if prov,ed, to
make the construction of applicant's pipe line and
facilities economically feasible." (Italics ours.)
The term "proved" refers to a sufficient development
of "blocked out" available gas at the surface. The Commission in effect gave the Respondent Utah Natural Gas
Company one year to develop from the adequate reserves
such a proven available amount to justify the financing
and immediate construction of the line. The Commission
said:
"* * * The Commission further concludes,
however, that conditions should be imposed upon
such authority so granted requiring that within
one year from the date the order granting such certificate of convenience and necessity shall be effective said Utah Natural Gas Company shall

*

*

*

*

*

"(b) Concurrently with the furnishing
of such commitment and as a part thereof, Utah
Natural Gas Company shall file with this Commission the certificate of an independent geologist of recognized professional standing, acceptable to this Commission, that there are proven
gas reserves committed to Utah Natural Gas
Company adequate to justify the construction
of the line and facilities; * * *"
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In the event the Utah Natural Gas Company does not
file with the Commission the certificate required the conditional rights issued shall become null and void. In the event
the Respondent does file such certificate any party to the
proceeding, including, of course, the Appellant, 'viii have
an opportunity to be heard and to cross-examine. If there
can be any question about the Commission's intention it is
fully explained and clarified by Commission's counsel in
his brief at page 16 wherein he states:
"It is contended by the Petitioner that the Public Service Commission of Utah in the Certificate
of Convenience and Necessity issued on March 12,
1951 delegated to a geologist the power of the Commission to make a finding as to the adequacy of the
gas supply of Utah Natural Gas Company. This, the
Commission did not intend to do and does not believe that it did do.
"In order to determine whether or not there is
an adequate supply of gas it is, of course, necessary
for the Commission to lean very heavily upon the testimony of expert witnesses on this subject. The Commission has listened to experts produced by Utah
Natural Gas Company, by Utah Pipe Line Company
and other interested parties and reserves the right to
make its own investigation to aid it to determine
this fact. If the language of the Commission order
is subject to the interpretation placed thereupon by
Petitioner, it certainly carries a meaning not intended by the Commission and for the inaptness of
the language, if such exists, counsel takes full responsibility. Upon the expiration of the one year
period granted in the certificate in which the applicant, Utah 1-Jatural Gas Company, may present evidence that it has an adequate supply of gas and
adequate financing available it is the intention of
the Public Service Commission of Utah to again set
the matter down for hearing. All interested parties
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will be given notice and will be given an opportunity
to appear. The burden of proof will be upon the
applicant, Utah Natural Gas Company to prove to
the satisfaction of the Commission that an adequate
supply of gas is available. This proof, of course,
must come in the form of testimony by competent
witnesses. The petitioner in this case, as well as all
other protestants, will be given an opportunity to
controvert this evidence if they feel that it is not
reliable. However, the Commission felt that before
it should proceed with any such hearing the applicant, Utah Natural Gas Company, should first furnish the Commission with documentary evidence
which would establish prima facie that the requirements of the certificate had been met. It was not
and is not the intention of the Commission to delegate any of its powers. When the necessary evidence
is in as to whether or not the conditions of the certificate have been met, the Commission will then
consider this additional evidence and on the basis of
that evidence will reach its own findings as to
whether or not Utah Natural Gas Company has
complied with the orders of the Commission and is
entitled to have its certificate made unconditional."
If the Commission's intention needed any clarification,
the foregoing should be sufficient. But even should this
Court presume that the Con1mission intended to deny Appellant a right to be heard on the question of "proven reserves", and intended to delegate to an "unknown geologist"
the Commission's duty to finally determine an ultimate
fact, it has not yet done so. Until it does so, Appellant has
not been imposed upon and therefore makes a premature
objection.
If Utah Natural Gas Company is unable to file its
certificate, Appellant will be content and Respondent's
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rights will terminate. If it does file the certificate the
Commission will then be obliged to proceed. If it does so
improperly Appellant can then object. Until that time the
question is moot.
POINT V.
THE COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT T·HE
DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATURAL RESOURCES OF THE STATE IS DESIRABLE IS
A PROPER FINDING AND IS NOT ONE
WHICH INDICATES l~.. FAILURE TO REGULARLY PURSUE ITS STATUTORY AUTHORITY.
The Appellant urges under Point H of its brief, at
page 132, that the Commission did not regularly pursue
its statutory authority, because by deciding that the development of Utah natural resources was desirable it thereby constituted itself "a development and conservation commission." This, the Appellant asserts, it had no authority
to do and therefore its ultra vires finding makes its conditional order void.
Appellant's conclusion is allegedly supported by several
cited cases. We desire to state the fact situations in these
cases so that this Court may see for itself the extent to
which Appellant has gone in its endeavor to make a point.
The only Utah case cited is In Re Clays, 1924-E P.
U. R. 178, page 136 of Appellant's brief. In that case applicant sought a certificate of convenience and necessity
to build an ore tramway from Alta to Wasatch in Little
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Cottonwood C·anyon. The Utah Public Service Commission,
after reviewing the testimony, said at page 188:
"Under all the circumstances and facts shown
to exist, we are of the opinion that this case does
not come within the provisions of the section of the
act authorizing the Commission to issue a certificate of convenience and necessity before the tramway is constructed, and that the Commission has no
jurisdiction to- authorize or deny the c·onstruction
of the tramway." (Italics ours.)
There is not a word in the case applicable to Appellant's contention.
In N ortkwest Businessmen's Association v. Illinois
Commission, 168 N. E. 890, page 136 of Appellant's brief,
the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the Commerce
Commission of Illinois could not rescind a prior order made
without making findings of fact different from the findings made in support of the original order, either on the
grounds that the original findings were erroneous or that
the facts had changed. The Illinois Supreme Court held
that the Commission, without doing this, could not change
its original order simply on a policy basis.
In State Ex Rel. Thatcher v. Boyle, et al., 204 P. 378,
at page 137 of Appellant's brief, the Appellant quotes the
syllabus to the effect that administrative tribunals are
creatures of statute, which fact no one can deny. The only
point cited in the Thatcher case was whether the Montana
Public Service Commission was authorized by its enabling
statute to regulate, as a public utility, irrigation compan·
ies. The enabling statute included "water for business".
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The Montana Court properly, we think, held that the irrigation company could not be regulated as a public utility
under such a statute.
In Backus-Brooks Company v. Northern Pacific Railroad Compa.ny, et al., 21 F. (2d) 4, page 137 of Appellant's
brief, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals held that the federal
district court was without jurisdiction to fix joint rates
because the preliminary question of what constituted a just
and proper rate had not been determined by the proper
commissions, to wit, the Interstate Commerce Commission
and the State Commission of Minnesota, and that therefore
the district court was without jurisdiction to award damages to a stockholder on account of a division of these joint
rates. As a part of this decision the Circuit Court held
that the Commission of Minnesota by reason of the broad
legislative language which conferred powers on it was
able to fix and establish joint rates. In reasoning to this
conclusion, the court by way of dicta stated the general
proposition that commissions created by statute can exercise only those powers which are delegated to it. Surely
this is not debatable.
In Re Montana Dakota Po~ver Company, P. U. R. 1929A 369, page 134 of Appellant's brief, several applicants
sought certificates to construct an electric transmission
line within the state in an area already b.eing served. The
main object of the transmission line, so far as the applicant
t Scranton Electric was concerned, appeared to be to pro~ vide a possible market for slack coal which was to be used
:~ as generating fuel, and so to build up that mining.property.
~ It appeared, however, from the testimony as found by the
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Commission, that "the proposed transmission line and local
plants are incidental to the coal mining industry." It thus
appears that the case in reality shows that the North Dakota Board considered the very policy question which the
Appellant claims could nof properly be determined.
We respectfully submit that the generalities, dicta and
contrary rulings in the foregoing cases not only fail to
support Appellant's point, they actually argue against it.
The powers given to the Public Service Commission of the
State of Utah are extremely broad. In 76-4-1, supra, the
Commission is given "power and jurisdiction to supervise
and regulate every public utility in this state, and to do
all things, whether herein specifically designated or not,
in addition thereto, which are necessary or convenient in
the exercise and power of such jurisdiction." We submit
that from this general grant alone the Commission was
am ply justified in finding that the development of natural
resources of the state is desirable.
But even should we assume for the purpose of argument that the Commission's so called "policy finding" in
this regard, constitutes a finding which was beyond the
Commission's delegated power, is it conceivable that such
a finding, which is undisputably in the best interests of the
state, will invalidate the Commission's. order? We submit
that taking Appellant's argument at its best the conclusion
reached is not only unsupported by authorities, but it is in
its fundamental aspects erroneous. Furthermore, it is ap·
parent from a reading of the Report and Order made that
the Commission's finding of convenience and necessity was
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not solely based on this so called policy finding but was
based on many other facts therein stated.

POINT VI.
THE COl\ilVIISSION DID NOT EXCEED ITS
L~.\ WFUL AUTHORITY IN HEARING THE APPLICATION OF THE UTAH NAT'URAL GAS
COMPANY BEFORE IT HEARD THE APPLICATION OF APPELLANT.
Under Point I of Appellant's brief, page 139, Appellant contends that because the Public Service Commission
of Utah heard the Respondent Utah Natural Gas Company's
application first, without hearing Appellant's application,
it proceeded unlawfully. In support of this proposition
Appellant cites several cases wherein it is generally stated
that "priority in the field does not of itself govern the
granting of a certificate."
\Ve will not cite cases to challenge this proposition, although we do point out that there are many cases which
also support holdings that "the applicant who first files
an application for a certificate of convenience and necessity should receive an award due his diligence." (See cases
cited in P. U. R. Digest, Vol. 1, Section 95). Undoubtedly
both of the foregoing generalizations correctly state the
law.
In the instant case the Commission received an application from the Respondent Utah Natural Gas Company
on May 29, 1950 (R. 1106). An amended application was
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filed on November 17, 1950 (R. 1111). Notice of hearing
was given on the 21st day of November, 1950. This notice
was published as required by law. On December 11, 1950,
the case came on for hearing in the Governor's board room
at the Capitol Building. The room was filled with interested parties. Some of them appeared to either object to
or support Respondent's application (R. 1, 2, 6, 7). At
that time Respondent Utah Natural Gas Company appeared
with all its witnesses. Most of them were from out of the
state. Notwithstanding these facts the Appellant on this
morning, for the first time, entered an appearance and indicated that it had an interest in the proceeding.
The facts show that two days before this appearance
it had been incorporated and presumably had filed an application before the Federal Power Commission. .on the
morning of its appear·ance Appellant had not filed an application for an intrastate certificate before the Utah Commission and did not file such application until more than
six W·eeks later, and after Respondent Utah Natural Gas
Company had presented its evidence. (Appellant~s brief,
page 150.)
The Respondent Utah Natural Gas Company objected
to Appellant's appearance as a party in intervention and
the Commission, after considering the matter, overruled
the objection and permitted Appellant to appear for the
limited purpose of objecting to the application of the Utah
Natural Gas Company.
More than six weeks after the first hearing date on
Respondent's application Appellant filed for the first time
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its application before the Utah Public Service Commission
seeking an intrastate certificate to construct its proposed
pipe line (Appellant's brief, page 150).
On this showing Appellant claims the Utah Public
Service Commission erred in proceeding with Respondent's
application without hearing Appellant's application first.
We submit that such a contention is so unreasonable that
it does not merit a serious answer. Does the Appellant
seriously contend that the Public Service Commission of
Utah should delay a matter which has already been set,
with witnesses present and all present, except Appellant,
ready to proceed, until Appellant files its application and
prepares a case? Suppose the Commission had been so in...
dulgent; what would have been accomplished? Until Appellant receives a certificate of convenience and necessity
from the Federal Power Commission, any action taken by
the Public Service Commission of Utah would not only be
premature, it would be moot. Furthermore, had the Commission delayed the hearing or decision on Respondent's
application until such time as the Federal Power Commission had determined whether or not Appellant should receive an interstate certificate of convenience and necessity,
the matter would still be in abeyance and in all probability
would remain in abeyance for several years to come. For
these reasons, as well as for many others that may appear,
we submit that the Commission would have acted arbitrarily and capriciously if it had delayed the matter as
suggested by Appellant in its brief.
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POINT VII.
THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION OF
UTAH DID NOT ACT ARBITRARILY AND
CAPRICIOUSLY IN NOT HAVING A FULL
JOINT HEARING BEFORE THE FEDERAL
POWER COMMISSION BEFORE RULING ON
RESPONDENT''S APPLICATION.
In Point K under Proposition IV of Appellant's. brief,
page 162, Appellant contends that it was the duty of the
Utah Commission to obtain a joint hearing of the entire
case. To support this strange conclusion it cites 1.37 (c)
of the Federal Power Commission Rules and Regulations,
and states that on December 21, 1950, the Federal Power
Commission wrote a letter to the Public Service Commission of Utah inquiring whether or not the latter desired
a joint hearing.
We, of course, are unable to determine from the record
whether the foregoing allegations are so. We assume that
the Federal Power Commission rule is correctly stated,
but we are entirely uninformed as to the contents of any
letter which the Federal Power Commission did, or did
not, send to the Utah Commission. Furthermore, we do
not know whether or not the Utah Commission answered
such letter, and if so what conclusions were reached. So
far as we know the Federal Power Commission and the
Utah Commission may have consulted together and reached
some tentative conclusion relative to the entire matter. In
any event, all these matters are outside the record and we
do not propose to engage in profitless argument about
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things which may or may not exist, and which in any event
are not properly before this Court.
If we assume that the off the record assertions of
Appellant are so, the conclusion which it urges does not
follow. It would be a strangely unique development in the
law if the decisions of State Commissions on intrastate
affairs were controlled by the rules and regulations of the
Federal Power Commission. We submit that when, and
if, the Utah Pipe Line Company, Appellant herein, completes its application and has a hearing before the Federal
Power Commission the rules and regulations of that body
will become applicable. Until then we assume that the
Utah law and the judgment of the Utah Commission will
control.
Appellant in its argument under Point K has erroneously,
we believe, twisted the meaning of the Federal Statutes
and rules enacted pursuant thereto, and has placed on the
Utah Commission an authorization which in fact is placed
upon the Federal Power Commission. Title 15, Sec. 717p.
of the Natural Gas Act provides :
"(a) The Commission may refer any matter
arising in the administration of this chapter to a
board to be composed of a member or members, as
determined by the Commission, from the State or
each of the States affected or to be affected by such
matter. Any such board shall be vested with the
same power and be subject to the same duties and
liabilities as in the case of a member of the Commission when designated by the Commission to hold
any hearings. The action of such board shall have
force and effect and its proceedings shall be con-
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ducted in such manner as the Commission shall by
regulations prescribe."
It would thus seem that the Federal Power Commission, and not the Public S.ervice Commission of Utah, is
the body authorized by statute to provide for joint hearings.
Perhaps when Appellant completes the preliminary matters necessary to confer jurisdiction and complies with the
Federal Power Commission requirements that Commission
will provide for a joint hearing. Until it does so the Appellant should not place that responsibility upon the Public
Service Commission of Utah.
There are many problems, outside the record, relating
to Appellant's application before the Federal Power Commission, which Appellant realizes even more than this
Respondent. It will serve no useful purpose to discuss them
herein. This case must be decided on this record.
In subheading J of Proposition IV of Appellant's brief,
pages 147, 161, Appellant argues that failure to provide a
joint hearing, either before the Federal Power Commission
or the Utah Commission was arbitrary and capricious for
a further reason; it did not afford Appellant an opportunity to show that it could supply natural gas more cheaply
than the Respondent.
We have attempted to answer this argument herein,
and also under Point VI, supra. We wish to add, however,
that while Appellant continually assumes that its application and Respondent's application are fundamentally the
same, this is untrue. One application is intrastate and
the other is interstate. Furthermore, Respondent proposes
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to serve a large portion of the state which is entirely un...
covered by Appellant's application. This more extensive
service of necessity means that Respondent's venture will
cost more to construct and maintain. Therefore, the relative over all costs are not c;omparable. The length of the
proposed lines, the size of the pipe, the location of the line,
the gathering facilities, the area to be served, and the capacity of the two systems; all differ materially. The ultimate cost to the consumer cannot be definitely determined
at this stage of the proceedings. This fact was frankly
admitted by Respondent during the course of the hearing,
and is apparently conceded by Appellant who in its application states approximate costs only.

CONCLUSION
The Utah Commission found that public convenience
and necessity require the furnishing of additional natural
gas to the Utah industrial area. The demand for natural
gas in this area is such that if an assured adequate supply
is available within the State of Utah no real problem of
engineering, economics or financing is presented in connection with the construction of the line.
So insistent is the public demand for this additional
gas supply that the Utah Commission concluded that this
public need was paramount to the detriment or disadvantage which might be sustained by protestants Mountain
Fuel Supply Company, the mine operators who are producing, the railroads which are transporting and the miners
who are mining, coal. Each of these protestants was a real
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party in interest. Each had a vital present and actual interest in the proposal of Utah Natural Gas Company and
each would be a party who might be aggrieved by the
order of the Commission. Yet none of these parties is here
objecting to the Commission's order.
The Appellant, on the other hand, neither owns, controls or relies upon any reserves of gas in the State of Utah.
It has no property whatever in this state. It has no customers, no public duty or responsibility of any kind in this
jurisdiction. The Utah Commission has no control whatever over Appellant; its application before that body could
be withdrawn tomorrow. Stated in the most favorable
light, the Appellant has at most only an expectancy that
it may, at some indefinite future date, bring gas into Utah
from another state. We believe it clear that Appellant is
not a party aggrieved by the order of the Utah Commission
within the meaning of our statute.
Appellant seeks to set aside and annul the Commission's order upon numerous grounds, some of which, such
as the claim that it did not receive sufficient notice of the
hearing, are so lacking in merit that we have not extended
this brief to dwell upon them. Primarily, the attack of the
Appellant seems to be directed at the restrictions and conditions which the Commission imposed upon the Respondent.
But the onus of these conditions fell not upon the
Appellant but rather upon the Respondent, Utah Natural
Gas Company. They were designed to give the Commission
a continuing control over the proceeding in the- interest

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

57
of the public. As we have pointed out, inasmuch as these
restrictions and conditions fell upon the Respondent, it,
and not the Appellant, would have the right to complain
of the impositions.
To us the imposition of these conditions demonstrates
a careful, considered and judicious attitude on the part of
the Utah Commission. We suppose that the Appellant would
have had the Utah Commission, instead of imposing conditions as it did and thereby keeping control of the proceedings, shut the door completely upon the Respondent,
thereby denying to those upon whom Respondent relies for
its gas supply, the opportunity to spend their own money
in exploration to gain assurance that if successful they
could bring their developed gas to market in a friendly
line.

Had the Commission, in the face of the record in this
proceeding, completely closed the door to the Respondent,
we believe such an order would have been arbitrary and
capricious. Instead, the Utah Commission in effect said
to the Respondent: "You have told us that you have available gas to supply the public convenience and necessity
of the industrial area of this state. The reserves on which
you rely have not yet been developed. You may have one
year in which your supporters, by spending their O"\Vn
money in exploration, can back up the opinion of their
geologists. If you succeed in developing the necessary gas
supply, you may go forward with your enterprise. If you
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fail, the door is closed upon your proposal." What could
be more reasonable than this?
The order should be sustained.
Respectfully submitted,
CLIFF'ORD L. ASHTON,
S. N. CORNWALL,
Attorneys for Respondent,
Utah Natural Gas Company.
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